5. The increase in revenues as a share of national income since 2009-10 has been driven by tax rises announced since May 2010. Fiscal events in the 2010-15 parliament contained measures that had the net effect of boosting revenues in 2017-18 by an estimated £10 billion. This figure arises from £60 billion of tax rises being offset by £50 billion of tax cuts. The net effect of measures announced since May 2015 has also been to increase tax. They are estimated to raise £15 billion (in today's terms) in 2021-22. This figure arises from tax-raising measures worth £35 billion being offset by tax cuts worth £20 billion.
6. On the spending side, the striking fact is that after seven years of austerity, public spending is only broadly back at pre-crisis levels as a fraction of national income. Cuts to large parts of government spending have only resulted in the size of the state being broadly unchanged for three reasons. First, the financial crisis pushed spending as a share of national income up sharply, and this increase has been undone. Second, continued weak economic growth in recent years has meant that a given real-terms cut to spending has delivered a smaller reduction in spending as a share of national income relative to both history and expectation. Third, some elements of spending have risen as a fraction of national income -most notably, spending on health, pensions and overseas aid -and so cuts have been required elsewhere.
A very weak recovery in GDP per adult, which is forecast to continue Figure 1. GDP per adult since 2008Q1
The financial crisis led to a sharp reduction in national income. But even more striking is the weakness of the subsequent recovery. National income per adult only returned to its pre-crisis level around the end of 2015, as shown in Figure 1 . This is a huge reduction in the size of the economy -and therefore the average living standards of UK householdsrelative to what we would reasonably have expected prior to the financial crisis. National income per adult is currently around 15% lower than what it would have been had output per adult instead grown by 2% a year.
The latest official forecasts -from the Spring 2017 Budget -are for this period of weak growth to continue. If correct, then by the start of 2022 the gap between actual national income per adult, and where it would have been had it grown by 2% a year throughout the period, will have risen to 18%.
This downgrade in expected income has adversely affected the finances of households and of the government. Government borrowing -that is, the difference between what the government spends and what it collects in receipts -is shown for each year since 1948 in Figure 2 . The deficit peaked at almost 10% of national income in 2009-10 and fell to 2.6% of national income in 2016-17. This is the same level as it was in the last financial year prior to the crisis (2007-08) but is above the long-run UK average prior to that (1.8% of national income).
Last autumn, in his first fiscal statement, the new Chancellor Phillip Hammond chose to abandon the existing fiscal rules (which had only been put in place a year before) and instead committed the government to eliminating the deficit by the end of the next parliament. The UK has had short periods in which a budget surplus has been delivered, but these have been rare and short-lived, with the last ones occurring during the three financial years from 1998-99 to 2000-01 (inclusive).
The latest forecasts suggest the deficit will fall over the next five years. But even had the next parliament run from May 2020 to May 2025, eliminating the deficit would have been far from straightforward, with the forecasts implying a deficit in 2021-22 of 0.7% of national income, which is equivalent to £15 billion in current terms. Eliminating the deficit before a May 2022 general election would be even harder, requiring a combination of tax rises and spending cuts worth £15 billion on top of current plans. 1948 1950 1955-56 1960-61 1965-66 1970-71 1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995- Figure 3 . At the time of the last general election, the Conservatives stated that they would eliminate the budget deficit by 2018-19, while our assessment was that under Labour's plans borrowing would be on course to be 1.4% of national income in that year. The enormous deficit caused by the financial crisis was due to tax receipts falling and -to a much greater extent -spending increasing, as a share of national income. The subsequent reduction in the deficit has come from increases in tax and a more significant reduction in spending. While in 2016-17 the deficit was at a similar level to that recorded prior to the crisis in 2007-08, both spending and receipts are slightly above their levels of a decade ago.
The latest forecasts imply revenues continuing to rise as a share of national income so that they reach their highest level since 1986-87. Current spending -that is, public spending excluding investment spending -is forecast to continue to be reduced as a share of national income. If correct, this implies revenues slightly exceeding current spending in 2018-19 (implying a current budget surplus), which would be the first time this had been achieved since 2001-02.
Investment spending (which represents the difference between total spending and current spending in Figure 4 ) is forecast to increase as a share of national income over the next five years, having been cut significantly during the first half of the 2010s. The large deficits recorded over the last few financial years have added considerably to the stock of public sector debt. Prior to the crisis, this was running at below 40% of national income. But, as shown in Figure 5 , it has since doubled and is forecast to peak in the current financial year at 88.8% of national income before falling back to 79.7% of national income in 2021-22. By recent UK historical standards, this is a high level of debtthe last time it was above 85% of national income was in 1965-66. But going further back, the UK had extended periods with debt at even more elevated levels. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides cross-country data on the public finances. Figure 6 presents the data on government borrowing for 35 advanced economies. It should be noted that these data are constructed, as far as possible, on a comparable basis and therefore do not match exactly the measures of borrowing that are typically used in the UK. They suggest that in 2016 the UK had the fifth-largest government borrowing out of these 35 countries. However it should also be noted that it is not uncommon for large economies to run larger deficits -the United States, Japan and France all had deficits larger than the UK. The notable exception from this pattern is Germany, which had a much lower level of borrowing (in fact, a surplus of 0.8% of national income).
The UK's relatively large deficit in 2016 is despite a relatively large reduction over recent years. At its peak, the UK's cyclically-adjusted deficit -that is, the deficit that is not thought to be explained by the ups-and-downs of the economic cycle -was larger than all but six other advanced economies. Since then, the UK has delivered the sixth-largest reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit (which is one measure of austerity). The IMF forecasts that only three other economies (Australia, Italy and France) will deliver a larger reduction in the cyclically-adjusted deficit over the six years from 2016 to 2022. The UK has the sixth-largest government debt out of 26 advanced economies Compared with the other advanced economies, the UK also has a relatively high level of government debt. Of the 26 economies for which IMF data are available, only five had a higher level of debt in 2016, as shown in Figure 7 . Similar to the picture for the deficit, there is a tendency for larger economies to have a weaker fiscal position: Japan, Italy, France and the United States all have a larger debt ratio than the UK. Again the outlier from this pattern is Germany, which has a significantly lower level of debt.
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As shown in Figure 4 , tax revenues as a share of national income are increasing. In principle, this can arise because of growth in the economy, and therefore underlying tax bases, pushing up revenues or because of discretionary changes to the tax system that boost revenues. Table 1 decomposes the change in revenues as a share of national income since 2009-10 into that which is estimated to arise from budget announcements made since May 2010 and the remainder.
In the current financial year, revenues are 0.3% of national income higher than they were in 2009-10. This is equivalent to £6.8 billion in today's terms. Of this, £14.5 billion is the estimated net impact of policy measures announced since the May 2010 general election, implying that absent these changes revenues would have fallen as a share of national income by the equivalent of £7.7 billion in today's terms.
This net increase in tax from discretionary measures can be further decomposed into those announced in fiscal events in the last parliament under the coalition government and those announced under the Conservative government since May 2015. The estimated impact of measures from the 2010-15 parliament has been to boost revenues in by £10.3 billion. This is the net effect of a very large set of tax cuts (totalling £50.0 billion) and an even larger set of tax rises (totalling £60.2 billion). The largest tax rises announced in that parliament were the increase in the main rate of VAT, the introduction of the bank levy and the abolition of contracting out into defined benefit pension arrangements. The most significant tax cuts were increases in the income tax personal allowance, cuts to the main rate of corporation tax and cuts to the rates of fuel duties.
Measures announced since May 2015 are estimated to have had the net effect of boosting revenues by a further £4.3 billion, with £25.1 billion of tax rises being offset by £20.9 billion of tax cuts. The long-run impact of measures announced in the 2015-17 parliament is estimated to be larger. By 2021-22, these measures are estimated to have the net impact of raising revenues by £14.9 billion (again in today's terms), with this arising from £19.9 billion of tax cuts being more than offset by tax rises of £34.7 billion. The largest taxraising measures announced in this parliament are the increase in the rate of tax on dividend income, the new apprenticeship levy and the increases in council tax (intended to boost social care funding). The largest tax cuts announced in this parliament are a further reduction to the rate of corporation tax and increases in the income tax personal allowance and higher-rate threshold.
Overall departmental spending no longer being cut in total, though per-capita spending forecast to continue falling The cuts to departmental spending seen since 2009-10 have been far from equally shared across departments and, for some, further cuts are planned. Figure 9 shows the overall real increase in spending planned for the period from 2010-11 through to 2019-20 for a selection of departments, with the cuts that have already been delivered -and those planned for the next three years -being shown separately.
The Department for International Development, the Department of Health and the Ministry of Defence are all set to see their budgets rise in real terms over the period 2016-17 to 2019-20. In addition, while the Department for Transport is having its day-to-day budget cut, it has been allocated a significant increase in its capital budget, such that its overall budget is forecast to increase significantly over the next three years. In contrast, several other departments have spending allocations that imply deep cuts -for example, the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs both have further deep cuts planned on top of those that they have already delivered since 2010-11. Spending on working-age benefits forecast to fall to below pre-crisis levels as a fraction of national income Figure 10 . Outlook for spending on benefits and tax credits
Cuts to working-age benefits have also contributed to the fall in public spending as a share of national income since 2009-10. Figure 10 shows spending on both pensioner benefits and working-age benefits since 2000-01, as a share of national income, with the latest forecasts running through to 2021-22. Spending on pensioner benefits has fallen slightly as a share of national income since 2012-13. While existing pensioners have benefited from the 'triple lock' on the state pension and have largely been protected from other benefit cuts, the rise in the female state pension age since April 2010 has helped to reduce spending. Further increases in the state pension age up to age 66 for both men and women by October 2020 will help restrain spending on pensioner benefits for the next three years.
Spending on working-age benefits has fallen more sharply since 2012-13, in part due to falling unemployment, but also due to measures that have made the benefits system less generous than it would have been for many working-age families. The latest forecasts imply that by 2021-22 spending on these benefits will have fallen to its lowest level as a share of national income since 2000-01. One result of choices over spending priorities made over the last decade has been to alter not just the level but also the make-up of public spending. Figure 4 showed that in the financial year before the financial crisis struck, 2007-08, total public spending was equal to 39.0% of national income. In the last financial year, this stood at 39.3% of national income. A decomposition of the change in public spending as a share of national income between these two years is shown in Figure 11 . This shows that the overall increase in spending was not split evenly: spending has risen as a share of national income in some areas, such as pensioner benefits, health and overseas aid, and fallen in others, such as schools, defence and public order & safety.
By the last year covered by the current spending period , spending is forecast to be 38.2% of national income, which is 0.8% of national income (equivalent to £16 billion in today's terms) below its level in 2007-08 and 1.1% of national income (equivalent to £23 billion in today's terms) below its level in 2016-17. The forecast reduction in spending as a share of national income between 2016-17 and 2019-20 is across a range of areas, including both health and pensioner benefits and also other areas where spending has been cut in recent years.
The resulting overall change in spending between 2007-08 and 2019-20 is presented in Figure 12 . This shows that spending on health, pensioner benefits and overseas aid will all have increased as a share of national income since 2007-08 (by a total of 1.3% of national income). Despite the large increase in public sector net debt (shown in Figure 5 ), the fall in government borrowing costs will mean that debt interest payments are forecast to be a Spending area particular) public order & safety, alongside other elements of government spending that don't fall within these categories, are also forecast to be lower as a fraction of national income in 2019-20 than they were in 2007-08. The sizeable cut to spending on public order & safety is in large part due to the fact that a large portion of this spending is from the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice (three-quarters of the total in 2015-16, with the remainder coming from DCLG and the devolved administrations) and the budgets of those two departments are planned to be cut by one-third in real terms over the period from 2010-11 to 2019-20 (see Figure 9 ). 
